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ABSTRACT 
Balochistan, the southwestern province of Pakistan, is 
taking on increased importance in regional affairs.  With 
the discovery of vast fields of natural gas, along with 
other valuable minerals, the region is experiencing 
increased interest from foreign investors and developers.  
Along with this, the terrain of Balochistan makes it a 
prime location for the development of roads, railroads and 
pipelines to connect the Middle East, Central Asia and 
South Asia.  To augment this development, the construction 
of a deep-water port at Gwadar has the potential of 
bringing globalization to the region in an exponential 
manner.  In the face of this development and growth are the 
Baloch, whose continued insurgencies have created an 
unstable environment.  Although deterring large-scale 
growth, interest in the region continues to grow, and with 
it, the threat of international politics and agendas 
colliding in a violent manner as Balochistan grows.  As 
such, the strategic importance of Balochistan lies in its 
potential to either take the forefront in development in 
South Asia, or be the epicenter of the next large-scale 
multinational conflict. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The area of present-day Balochistan in Pakistan has 
been at the crossroads of conquerors, explorers, settlers 
and traders for all of recorded history.  Its location is 
ideally suited for travel along the coast from the Middle 
East toward India and beyond, as well a critical hub for 
goods to and from Pakistan, Central Asia and points north. 
As a major crossroad, it is curious that the area should be 
so uninhabited, a desert of mystery and unknown.   
Prior to Partition, the British used it as a buffer 
state, which means they administered it indirectly though 
tribal leaders and chiefs, a practice that continued after 
the creation of the Pakistani state despite several 
insurgent outbreaks.1  Currently, the Pakistan government 
struggles to control it in order to maintain territorial 
sovereignty along with the newfound mineral and other 
resources. The Baloch have since 1947 launched five revolts 
against the central government. 
However, its importance has come increasingly into 
focus, due to the world’s changing political and economic 
situation because, as Kaplan points out, competition is 
becoming fiercer with diminishing amounts of new or 
emerging markets.2  The current conflict that is taking 
place in Afghanistan also points to the importance of this 
                     
1  Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 2-5. 
2  Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of 
American Power (New York City: Random House, 2010), 4-5. 
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region as it serves as the entry point for military and 
relief logistics heading into the combat zone.  As combat 
operations intensify, Balochistan is increasingly becoming 
a safe haven for NATO’s enemies, which threatens to bring 
the neighboring war to the Baloch doorstep.3  These issues, 
along with a history of domestic troubles with the center, 
are potential indicators of future concern that requires 
more attention.  With increasing pressures from regional 
and international actors in their bids for power and 
influence, and with its prime location along multiple sea 
and land routes to multiple barely tapped markets, what is 
the strategic importance of Balochistan?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Numbers of security issues of global dimensions are 
linked to what is taking place in Pakistan.  Safe havens 
for terrorists, extremists and gun and drug smugglers along 
its western border invite pressures from the United States 
and its allies.  Energy issues, not only in South Asia, but 
also Europe, Russia and China, have brought increased 
interest in the region.  With plans for pipelines to carry 
natural gas and oil that either originate or transit 
Pakistan, and more specifically Balochistan, the security 
of the region and pacification of the Baloch takes on 
increased importance.4  To the east is the enduring security 
dilemma with India that has become more tenuous now that 
both countries are nuclear-armed.  Internally, various 
                     
3 Pepe Escobar, Balochistan is the Ultimate Prize, May 9, 2009, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KE09Df03.html. 
4 UNPO, "Balochistan: Its Importance For The Iran-Pakistan-India Gas 
Pipeline,” Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, March 23, 
2010, http://www.unpo.org/article/10894. 
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factions are vying for control at the local, regional and 
national level, requiring the government to exert constant 
military intervention against their own people.  For 
instance, the military’s presence in FATA areas is assured 
for years to come with its half-hearted efforts and 
shifting priorities.5   Shortages of natural resources and 
strategic location are prime factors for additional 
international pressures placed on the government.  
Ironically, these same resources are the reason why the 
Pakistani central government cannot afford to deal with the 
insurgents demands.  With the vital necessity of the 
resources, as well as the security of the region for 
extraction and distribution, while the Baloch have more 
incentive to fight, the central government has 
exponentially more reason to for the “ruthless crushing of 
the insurgency.”6   
Given this context, Balochistan’s importance to the 
various power brokers in the region is apparent despite the 
fact that it was solely a national concern for years.  
Instability in Balochistan is not limited to Pakistani 
politics, nor can it be dismissed as a regional Islamic 
issue, as the Baloch, while Muslim, are secular in their 
politics.  With repeated claims for greater levels of 
autonomy for the Baloch, this is largely a nationalistic 
movement.  For the Pakistani government, who has dealt with 
various splinter factions, this is another insurgency that 
                     
5 Ahmed Rashid, "Renewed Strains Between Islamabad and Washington," 
BBC News South Asia, June 25, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10375056. 
6 Dr. Robert J. Wirsing, "Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of 
Energy Resources: The Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan,” 




cannot succeed, as it would add fuel to other claimants 
along similar lines; there cannot be another Bangladesh.  
Prior to the discovery of natural resources, this was a 
local problem that was rarely paid attention to by other 
nations until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Harrison, 
for instance, first predicted a “worst-case” scenario 
involving a Soviet war in Afghanistan, the reaction of the 
region and the strategic significance of Balochistan.7  When 
this hypothetical situation became a reality in 1979, 
Harrison expanded upon his earlier work showing a Soviet 
bid for a deep-water port on the Indian Ocean, and 
specifically the role that the Baloch potentially held in 
this endeavor.8    
Currently, the international players interested in the 
region have expanded. Security issues in the region involve 
global players such as China, Iran, and India in the 
politics and the future of Balochistan.9  The state is 
ideally situated for access to South and Central Asia, the 
Middle East and the east coast of Africa.  It is posed for 
overland travel to Russia, as well as a marketplace for 
East and Southeast Asian goods.  It has plenty of real 
estate for extensive building projects, along with access 
to a cheap labor pool.  This unskilled labor, however, 
creates additional problems, as technical projects require 
augmentation from skilled Punjabi labor.  Militarily, it is 
important from a logistical standpoint as it provides a 
                     
7 Selig S. Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan,” Foreign Policy, 
Autumn, 1978: 136-160, 137. 
8 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and 
Soviet Temptations (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1981). 
9 Kaplan, Monsoon, 10. 
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location for the rapid buildup of power and onward 
deployment and resupply to each of the aforementioned 
locations.  From a defensive standpoint, an advanced air 
force and navy operating from Balochistan can also exert 
control over the Straits of Hormuz as well as the shipping 
lanes transiting across the Indian Ocean.  Finally, the 
plethora of valuable natural resources discovered in 
Balochistan has made this area all the more critical in the 
complex strategic interests of multiple states.  Because of 
these reasons, the location and riches of Balochistan have 
taken a dramatic rise in importance to the regional and 
international community. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
1. PROBLEMS 
Why should we care what is happening in Balochistan? 
As described, the importance of the region is due its 
location and the presence of resources, and not the Baloch 
themselves, although they are deeply affected raising the 
issue of human rights.10  As national economies expand into 
various markets and competition for valuable resources 
intensifies, Balochistan due to its location and resources 
stands to be caught in the crossfire of multiple agendas.   
The Baloch have illustrated that they are willing and able 
to put up fierce resistance in order to preserve their 
homeland and way of life.  Distrust of not only foreign 
governments, but also their own Pakistani government is 
apparent.  Certain opportunists in the various Baloch 
                     
10 Raza Rumi, "Pakistan: Separatism and its Discontents,” Human 




resistance movements attempts to play international 
interests against Pakistan in hopes of gaining independence 
or higher level of autonomy. For example, Pakistan has 
accused India of helping the Baloch with their 
insurgencies, including the current struggle.11 These 
efforts have thus far not amounted to any tangible results 
except cause military intervention in the state; however, 
as interest in the area increases, there is the potential 
for great powers to maneuver against each other pushing 
Baloch interests aside.  Given that, the question that 
guides this thesis is why it is strategically critical to 
solve the long-lasting problem of Balochistan and why 
possible solutions have to involve the international 
community. 
2. HYPOTHESES 
The thesis is guided by the recent history of the 
Baloch who are adamant about maintaining their way of life 
and controlling their own resources, an obstinacy that left 
unchanged will keep them wrapped in conflict with the 
central authorities. Also its growing international 
importance is critical for understanding what lies in its 
future, given the fact that merely 30 years ago, only 
surrounding regional powers, such as India and Iran, cared 
about what was occurring in the state. However, I argue 
here that the changes in the international and regional 
setting mean that a neglected Balochistan may turn into the 
next serious global conflict, which can be averted through 
                     
11 ANI, "'Undeniable' evidence regarding India's involvement in 




timely action.  In addition, I argue that it is important 
for the international community to get involved given the 
history of center-state relations and the regional security 
concerns.  Finally, with its strategic location at the 
crossroads of countries with ethnic turmoil, logistical 
access and plenty of places to hide, Balochistan is ideally 
suited as a future safe-haven for terrorists. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The importance of Balochistan appears to ebb and flow 
with the times and the current local and regional power 
structure.  What is also clear from the available 
literature is that the Baloch have an uncanny resistance to 
change.  With little in the way of written records kept by 
the Baloch, the earliest accounts are from the conquerors 
and traders that interacted with the Baloch.  Although 
interesting, there is no real detail provided until the 
time of the British occupation, and it is from these 
writings that we first begin to gain an understanding of 
the people and the landscape. 
In the 1840s, a deserter from the British military 
writing under the pseudonym Charles Masson, described his 
journeys through Balochistan and the surrounding areas.12  
These works paint a picture of life with the nomads.  It 
also points out the importance of the Sardari (tribal) 
system that will play so prominently in Baloch insurgency a 
century later.  Although not making any military or 
political claims about the importance of the region or the 
people, outside of casual observations regarding fertility 
                     
12 Charles Masson, Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, 
Afghanistan and the Panjab (London: Richard Bentley, 1842). 
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of the region and water, Masson’s writings spurred interest 
in the region that would lead to military and political 
decisions.  This interest was in large part due to the 
“Great Game” between Britain and Russia, especially as 
Russia gained dominance in Central Asia with an eye toward 
the Indian Ocean and the vast markets along the land and 
sea Silk Roads.13   
The general themes regarding the region echo earlier 
analyses of a harsh landscape devoid of anything useful.  
In 1882, Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor visited 
Balochistan, arriving at Gwadar and travelling along the 
coast before turning inland.14  With the Great Game in full 
swing and the dominance of the British Navy, a passing 
remark is made as the suitability of Gwadar as a port, but 
is largely dismissed due to the lack of resources or 
finished goods to buy, or any significant sized population 
to sell to.  The importance of the road networks connecting 
India with Afghanistan and Central Asia and Iran are 
commented on, but the main argument centers again on the 
location as a useful buffer zone from foreign attacks from 
the west or the north, as well as the usefulness of the 
Baloch in fighting any transgressors to the region. 
In 1904, Mansel Longworth Dames wrote about the Baloch 
people,15 again mirroring many of the observations already 
made. Written from an anthropological view, it demonstrates 
                     
13 David Fromkin, "The Great Game in Asia,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 
1980, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/33619/david-fromkin/the-
great-game-in-asia. 
14 Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor, Wanderings in Balochistan (London: 
W. H. Allen and Co., 1882). 
15 Mansel Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race: A Historical and 
Ethnological Sketch (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1904), 34-40. 
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the unity and power exerted by this tribal people, 
especially in relation to the Sardar.  In this work, more 
emphasis is placed on the Sardar as the role model and 
voice of the people, observations that would have proven 
beneficial in just a few short decades at Partition.   
Taken individually, these accounts are interesting 
diversions about life in an earlier time.  However, there 
are some very telling points that can be drawn out of them 
that are significant today.  First is the lack of material 
resources.  Europeans write the books that we have with a 
focus on the Great Game, leading to a repetitive account of 
the lack of resources, tough people and value as a buffer 
state.  Following Partition in 1947, there remains very 
little written about the region outside of comments about 
the latest insurgency that Pakistan has to deal with.  
Although there is a small flurry of activity when East 
Pakistan breaks off and becomes Bangladesh, Balochistan is 
still widely ignored by the rest of the world despite 
extensive military activity in the region under Zulfikar 
Bhutto.  During the period from 1972–1977, he disbanded the 
Balochistan government, sent roughly 30,000 troops into 
Balochistan and killed an estimated 9,000 militants and 
civilians.  This exemplified the broader problems in 
Pakistan following Bangladesh independence as Iran assisted 
the Pakistani central government maintain control while 
Iraq and the Soviets were covertly supplying the Baloch 
rebels in what could be perceived as a precursor of Soviet 
ambitions leading up to the Soviet/Afghan War along with 
broader regional rivalries.  It is not until the early 
1980’s with the discovery of copper and coal, along with 
the natural gas already being extracted, that Balochistan 
 10 
begins gaining larger interest, namely from India and Iran 
and the proposed Iran–Pakistan–India (IPI) pipeline, with 
discussions also beginning with Central Asia, Russia and 
China for additional pipelines or spurs off of the IPI.16   
With these new finds and the war next-door in full 
swing, Balochistan is not looked at in larger strategic 
importance outside of sporadic bilateral or trilateral 
discussions between global powers and the Pakistani central 
government.  Furthermore, although human rights and poverty 
levels are cited by leading NGOs, the rhetoric has failed 
to cause action, reprisal or sanctions against Pakistan.  
Authors like Mehtab Ali Shah, among many others, point to 
the impact of millions of refugees arriving in Balochistan 
during the Soviet/Afghan War after 1979.17  Many of these 
accounts also tie in the Taliban and cross-border attacks, 
which are not surprising as they were encouraged and funded 
by nations involved in the Soviet containment policy of the 
Cold War, and therefore carry little relevance.  Peter 
Blood argues that the Soviets were trying to woo the Baloch 
into another revolt against the center and that such 
actions would be rewarded with autonomy following the 
Soviet victory in Afghanistan.18  Other authors such as 
Shaheen Khan have focused on Balochistan as it relates to 
regional conflict resolution.  He points to the problems 
                     
16 Ariel Cohen, Lisa Curtis, and Owen Graham, "The Proposed Iran-
Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline: An Unacceptable Risk to Regional 
Security,” The Heritage Foundation, May 30, 2008, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/the-proposed-iran-
pakistan-india-gas-pipeline-an-unacceptable-risk-to-regional-security. 
17 Mehtab Ali Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on 
Diplomacy 1971 – 1994 (New York City: I.B. Taurus and Co Ltd, 1997), 
32-35. 
18 Peter R. Blood, Pakistan: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: 
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995), 4-5. 
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that Pakistan has within its borders as well as with its 
immediate neighbors, as the real reasons that Pakistan has 
not experienced more growth.19  His arguments are presented 
well; however, they are mired in obvious observations and 
regional biases and lack any possible workable solutions. 
Mary Ann Weavers provides a good account of the life 
and politics of the modern Baloch as it relates to the 
Pakistani government, inter-tribal relationships and the 
regional impact of Iranian, Indian and Afghanistan 
politics.20  Her conversations provide insight into what 
must be assumed is general sentiment by the Baloch about 
the government (both local and national), their neighbors 
and the resource extraction.  If this is the “everyman” 
opinion of Balochistan, than it lends credence to the 
overall subjugation and manipulation of the Baloch people 
by not only national and international players, but adds 
the internal complexity of a growing dissent among the 
Baloch toward their Sardars.  If this is the case and a 
leader emerges that is able to galvanize the people, then 
civil war in Balochistan could also be on the horizon that 
has the potential to dwarf earlier conflicts in the area.  
This assertion is based off seemingly accepted accounts 
from authors such as Nina Swidler that insinuates that the 
complex familial tribal system is an enduring way of life 
and source of continuity for the Baloch ever-changing 
political landscape.21 
                     
19 Shaheed Rafi Khan, Regional Trade Integration and Conflict 
Resolution, (New York City: Routledge, 2009), 22. 
20 Mary Ann Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan 
(New York City: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), 29-30. 
21 Nina Swidler, "Kalat: The Political Economy of a Tribal Chiefdom,” 
American Ethnologist, August 1992, 553-570. 
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In terms of extra-international interest in Baloch, 
more recently, Geoffrey Kemp22 and Robert Kaplan23 have 
written about the rising role of China’s involvement in 
Pakistan.  In their works, they begin to show a broader 
international context regarding Balochistan’s significance 
in world affairs.  Kemp points to the outpouring of money 
by the Chinese throughout South Asia as they attempt to 
place themselves in economic or distribution centers in an 
attempt to corner the global market.24  Kaplan also 
describes the strategic importance of Gwadar Port in 
Balochistan, as well as planned road and pipeline networks 
that originate or traverse Balochistan in a broader 
economic context.  He further expresses how these 
initiatives have the ability to bring peace and stability 
to the region as governments pursue economic vice 
idealistic policies.25  This thesis will effectively tie all 
of these pieces together to illustrate the global strategic 
importance of Balochistan.  It is clear that the 
governments of Pakistan, the region and internationally 
have little regard for the Baloch since most of the 
references cited thus far have focused on the economic 
advantages of Balochistan.  I hope to show the importance 
and need of a humanitarian solution along economic and 
political ones for a long-lasting agreement or an accord.  
As more international actors begin to descend upon the 
region, the Baloch stand to be further marginalized within 
                     
22 Geoffrey Kemp, The East Moves West: India, China and Asia's 
Growing Presence in the Middle East (Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2010), 4. 
23 Kaplan, Monsoon, 12. 
24 Kemp, The East Moves West, 6. 
25 Kaplan, Monsoon, 13. 
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their own province, a reaction that has historically proven 
to result in armed conflict.  It is entirely possible that 
one of these uprisings could involve large enough numbers 
of casualties from foreign countries as to spark an armed 
response of their own.  With Pakistan’s historical 
acceptance of foreign militaries operating from bases in 
Pakistan, most notably that of the Americans which began as 
early as 1957,26 as well as lack of repercussions when these 
militaries kill Pakistani civilians and military personnel, 
could well lead to a “Wild West” scenario.  With increasing 
numbers of countries investing in and operating from 
Balochistan, there is increased risk of seemingly minor 
incidents escalating into international incidents that 
threaten not only the Baloch, but also all of South Asia, 
with the added possibility of encompassing all of the 
globalized powers. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The background information for the framework of will 
come largely from books and journal articles from 
historical and social studies sources.  Additionally, 
historical analysis of various print media from the region 
is needed along with American, Russian and Chinese sources, 
to get a better idea of how the region not only views 
itself, but also how they are viewed by some of the major 
contenders in the region.  Finally, although a lack of 
academic research exists in describing the regions, 
comparing similar veins of thought from various extremists 
 
 
                     
26 Aamjad Syed Ali, Glimpses (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992), 32. 
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groups in Balochistan may present a pattern that could 
provide clues toward possible solutions to an ongoing 
problem.   
F. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The second chapter will illustrate the significance of 
Balochistan due to it physical geography in relation to 
transportation opportunities.  Namely, how it is ideally 
situated for road, rail and pipeline transportation of 
goods and services throughout the region as well as the 
Middle East, Central Asia/Russia and South Asia.  The third 
chapter will show the significance of the vast, largely 
untapped, natural resources in Balochistan and how the 
Gwadar Port project ties into this as a means for 
propelling Pakistan into globalization.  The fourth chapter 
will show how the stated goals of the Baloch run counter to 
displayed agendas and how continued insurgency threatens 
the stability of the region.  Further, as the pursuit of 
their goals enters increasing levels of international 
involvement, the potential for international intervention 
along with political agendas can thrust the region into 
chaos.  The final chapter will tie together all of the 
pieces, showing how the strategic importance of Balochistan 
lies in the vast rewards available to whomever can master 
the region, and dangers involved depending on the lengths 
that countries will go to in order to secure these riches.  
 15 
II. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN AND NATURAL 
TERRAIN 
Under the agreement, Pakistan recognizes Kalat as 
an independent sovereign state with a status 
different from that of the Indian state. An 
announcement from New Delhi said that Kalat, a 
Muslim state in Balochistan, has reached an 
agreement with Pakistan for free flow of 
Communications and Commerce and would negotiate 
for decision on Defense Foreign Affairs and 
Communications.27 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The strategic importance of Balochistan lies in its 
combination of location, resources and the people.  In 
addition, these factors are not mutually exclusive. 
Instead, the way these factors relate to each other causes 
them to become of strategic importance when taken as a 
collective. In this chapter, the focus is on the geographic 
aspect of this triad. Here, I illustrate how the natural 
terrain places Balochistan at the crossroads of an 
increasingly important trade intersection between the 
Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia.  By looking at 
the physical terrain in conjunction with the human terrain, 
Chapter II will demonstrate how they converge in a way that 
sets the framework for the current struggles, and more 
importantly, the potential for intense escalation of 
violence in Balochistan.   
                     
27 Waseem Altaf, "Accession at gunpoint,” Viewpoint, April 8, 2011, 
http://www.viewpointonline.net/accession-at-gunpoint.html. 
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B. THE CROSSROADS OF COMMERCE 
According to the CIA World Factbook estimates,28 there 
are approximately 187 million people in Pakistan, with the 
Baloch accounting for 3.5% (~6.7 million) of the 
population, living in a province that composes roughly 44% 
of the nation.  The shaded area of Figure 1 displays the 
region referred to by the Baloch as Greater Balochistan, as 
it encompasses the Baloch living in Pakistan, Iran and 
Afghanistan.  Historical oral tradition along with 
archeological support states that this is one of the oldest 
settlements in the world.29  Although it is arguable that 
the people that lived in the area 15,000 years are the 
direct ancestors of the current population,30 this rhetoric 
is used to rally support for the continued assertion for 
greater autonomy from the central Pakistan government.  
Quotes such as “the Baloch who are inherently loving and 
peaceful people, have been forced to fight back for their 
existence and national identity throughout centuries”31 
exemplify this rhetoric by drawing upon the passions and 
pride of ancestral struggles. 
With at least six armed insurgencies in Pakistan and 
one in Iran along with the continued support of the Afghani 
Baloch, the idea of Greater Balochistan transcends national 
politics and exemplifies the porous nature of manmade 
                     
28 Central Intelligence Agency, "South Asia:: Pakistan,” The World 
Factbook, March 8, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/pk.html. 
29 Sarbaz, "History of Balochistan,” Balochwarna, 2009, 
http://www.balochwarna.com/modules/mastop_publish/?tac=More_On_Baloch. 




borders.  In much the same way as the Korean Conflict and 
the Vietnam War showed the futility of inserting foreign 
objectives onto revolutionary or independence movements, 
the current ideology of globalization, whereby trade and 
the pursuit of wealth transcends local politics, has the 
potential for similar outcomes. 
Figure 1: Map of Greater Balochistan  
With Inset of Gwadar Port.32 
                     





C. HUMAN TERRAIN 
Human terrain defined in military terms “involves 
proper systemic identification, framing, and balance of the 
actual human terrain's social, political, or economic 
problems in the particular area of interest in direct 
correlation to goal outcomes.”33  It is a way in which 
analysts are able to study the human aspects of a region to 
determine their role and importance and how various 
societies, with their unique customs and practices will 
react to outside stimuli.  In this way, political and 
military authorities can better formulate approaches to 
interact with the local population in a way that is 
conducive and ideally involves a level of “win-win” for all 
participants.  In this case, the subject population is 
primarily that of the Baloch who have occupied the area now 
referred to as Balochistan for much, if not all, of 
recorded history.  Also of significance is that the Baloch 
do not limit their region to the borders contained within 
Pakistan, but instead they see all of their ancestral land 
extending into modern-day southern Afghanistan and 
southeastern Iran as part of their cultural and political 
heritage.  This assertion has led to contention with the 
aforementioned governments, and while this is important, 
falls outside of the scope of this thesis. 
 
                     
33 Irregular Warfare Centre, "Unconventional Solutions for Irregular 
Conflict,” The Irregular Warfare Centre, 2009, 
http://www.irregularwarfare.org/. 
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1. The Baloch 
The tribe is a self-contained world.  At its 
centre is the Sardar or chief of the tribe.  
Tall, full-bearded, in flowing clothes and heavy 
turban, the Sardar is not unlike Sean Connery 
playing a tribal chief.  He symbolizes Baloch 
custom and tribal tradition.  Honor, hospitality, 
and bravery are displayed in his behavior.  The 
tribe revels in his glory.  The word of the 
Sardar is law, his authority total.  In an area 
threatened by nature and, often, invading tribes 
unity under the Sardar became the key to 
survival.  The Baloch have a saying, ‘the Baloch 
will swear on the Holy Quran but never on the 
head of the Sardar.34 
The Baloch are a tribal society and are the “majority 
ethnic inhabitants of the region of Balochistan in the 
southeast corner of the Iranian plateau in Southwest Asia, 
including parts of Iran, Afghanistan, Oman and Pakistan.”35  
Each tribe is headed by a Sardar who holds absolute power 
over his tribe and sub-tribes.  Such local form of 
political organization has existed for hundreds of years, 
and as common with tribal societies, there is intense 
inter-tribal rivalry and feuding.36  In spite of this 
infighting, it never reached the scale that would change or 
abolish the system or fracture the society as a whole.  As 
with many of the tribes in this region, the basic 
philosophy of hospitality, family and revenge exist, with 
                     
34 Akbar S Ahmed, Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity and Leadership 
in South Asia (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1986), 188. 
35 Mir Ahmad Baloch, "Baloch History,” Jimdo, 2010, 
http://shohaz.jimdo.com/baloch-history/. 




intense loyalty to the Sardar.37  This final note is 
poignant for the Pakistani government in that it is the 
Sardars who are at the helm of resistance, conversely, also 
through the Sardars lays the road to compromise.38   
This thesis leads off with the human terrain because 
it is an underlying foundation of a system that is 
important for every chapter and subchapter of this thesis.  
As the Baloch maintain their claims of autonomy and 
vigorously fight for the attainment of this goal, 
advancement and development are retarded in the region.  
With overwhelming odds against them, this appears to be a 
classic case of “cutting off their nose to spite their 
face” mentality since the Pakistani government is unlikely 
to grant full autonomy and in the face of insurgency.  
Equally unlikely is that the government will pursue growth 
and development in the province as it would provide 
financial support to the rebels while also providing 
increased targets for attack.  With increasing interest in 
the region by the international community and advancing 
methods of spreading their message, the Baloch are more 
determined than ever to maintain their culture and achieve 
autonomy through more drastic measures and in a highly 
varied manner.39   
                     
37 Dr. Nasir Dasthi, "A Brief History of Balochistan," Baloch 
Homeland, June 15, 2009, http://www.balochhomeland.com/homeland-
article2.htm. 
38 Dasthi, “A Brief History of Balochistan.” 
39 Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004,(Boulder: Paradigm 
Publishers, 2004), 54.  Social Movement Theory contends that people 
mobilize through claims of identity, political standing, and goals.  
Central to this theme is the charismatic leader who can organize and 
mobilize.  Testament to the strength of the cause is indicated through 
continued support following the passing of control of the group to a 
new leader. 
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D. PHYSICAL TERRAIN 
The land of Balochistan is exceedingly 
inhospitable; geologists have even compared the 
landscape with Mars. A Pakhtu expression, 
reflecting on ethnic relations as well as on 
geography, describes Balochistan as ‘the dump 
where Allah shot the rubbish of creation.’40 
The primary reason for the increasing interest in 
Balochistan lies in its geographical location.  Bracketed 
on the east and west by high rugged mountain ranges (the 
Zagros in Iran and the Toba Kakar in Pakistan/Afghanistan), 
Balochistan is canalized and serves as the easiest land 
route to western Afghanistan and the rich energy reserves 
and emerging markets of Central Asia.  As a flat plain, 
Balochistan has longed served as the ideal crossroads for 
merchants and militaries for centuries travelling between 
the Middle East and South Asia.   
In addition to its advantages for overland travel, the 
blue-water access at Gwadar has been of historical 
interest, primarily by the Soviets/Russians.  So much was 
this the case, that the British ensured the loyalties of 
the Baloch during the 1860s and 1870s, as not only buffer 
against expanding Persian influence, but also to stop the 
expanding Russian Empire from reaching the Indian Ocean, 
thus threatening the British commercial dominance in the 
region.41  More recently, the Soviets again made a bid for 
this region when they courted the Baloch during the 
                     
40 Punjabics, "Baloch Rights or Sardars’ Rights?,” Punjabics, 2010, 
http://www.punjabics.com/PunjabicsBalochistanForum/Baloch_Rights_Or_Sar
dars_Rights.html. 
41 Mehrab Sarjou, "The demands for independent Baluchistan no longer 
can be ignored,” Balochwarna, May 4, 2011, 
http://www.balochwarna.com/modules/articles/article.php?id=2216. 
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Soviet/Afghanistan War illustrating the ongoing importance 
of this crossroads region.42  With the quagmire that the war 
became for the Soviets, this relationship never fully 
developed, but it interesting to ponder what the region 
might look like today if the Soviets had been successful in 
expanding into Afghanistan and then into Balochistan. 
Due to all of the advantages of the physical geography 
of Balochistan, a number of projects have been initiated or 
planned by various national and extra-national actors.  
These include high-speed road networks, railroads and 
pipeline that will make the transit of goods and services 
throughout the region more efficient and cheaper.  On one 
hand, this could be a boon for the Baloch as millions of 
dollars in infrastructure and development are offered up by 
multi-national organization and surrounding countries.  
Instead, this competition is more likely to intensify 
concerns and conflict as the Baloch face increasing 
pressures from the Pakistani government to head off the 
loss of these revenues.  With Iran, the Central Asian 
countries, Russia, India and China all looking to make 
inroads and profit from these projects, the delicate 
balance of power of South Asia is threatened by the Baloch. 
1. Pipelines 
The primary reason that Balochistan has gained 
international attention is because of the vast natural gas 
fields discovered there in 1952.43  Although control of the 
natural gas field started immediately, it is due to the 
                     
42 Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 43-44. 
43 Punjabics, “Baloch Rights or Sardars’ Rights?” 
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vast growth in industry and modernization in South Asia and 
associated increase in energy demand that led to large-
scale pipeline projects.44  As Figure 2 depicts, there are 
two major proposed pipelines with multiple sponsors within 
the region, along with the Chinese, that will transit 
Balochistan carrying natural gas from Iran to India and 
Turkmenistan to Pakistan, with both pipelines stopping at 
Gwadar Port.  As previously discussed, there are also 
significant gas reserves in Balochistan that are supposed 
to be pumped into this pipeline largely for consumption in 
eastern Pakistan or internationally.   
A 2005 study illustrating the importance of these 
pipelines in the region shows that India’s market for 
natural gas is estimated to be 105 Million Standard Cubic 
Meters per Day (MSCMPD), yet its own natural resources can 
only provide roughly 65 MSCMPD.  Furthermore, the study 
estimates that by 2020, India’s demand will climb to 400 
MSCMPD, of which 100 to 150 can be provided domestically.45 
In addition to the obvious energy issues, Iran is keenly 
interested in increased relations with India as a way to 
increase political support from India, and through them, 
improved global standing.46  As an added advantage, cheaper 
gas and a friendly Iran will greatly increase India’s 
                     
44 Gal Luft, "Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline: The Baloch Wildcard,” 
Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, January 12, 2005, 
http://www.iags.org/n0115042.htm. 
45  Hari Sud, "Pakistan as Network Headquarter for Natural Gas Supply 
to India,” South Asia Analysis Group, April 3, 2005, 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers13%5Cpaper1277.html. 
46 Luft, “Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline.” 
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dominance in South Asia, swinging the balance of power with 
Pakistan even more in its favor.47  
With agreements from India with Iran and Turkmenistan 
for pipelines to fill this gap, a stable Balochistan is 
required, a stability that is yet to be resolved as 
evidenced by the constant attacks against the pipelines and 
construction crews.48  With the current instability in 
Balochistan, countries such as India are being forced to 
consider alternate transportation of natural gas via 
maritime shipping that will cost more and with less 
efficiency, but more reliability.49  This option also ties 
into India–Iran cooperation in the Chabahar Port project as 
well as the M-6 road project discussed later in this 
chapter.  With natural gas requirements estimated to 
increase for the entire region as globalization expands 
into the new markets of Central Asia and the surrounding 
region, along with the importance of gaining access to 
these markets, India serves a clear example of pipeline 
importance.   
                     
47 Luft, “Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline.” 
48 Ordons News Team, "Three more gas pipelines blown up in 
Balochistan" Ordons News, February 13, 2011, 
http://www.ordons.com/asia/southeast-asia/10200-three-more-gas-
pipelines-blown-up-in-balochistan.html. 
49 Luft, “Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline.” 
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Figure 2: Proposed and Existing Natural Gas Pipelines in 
South Asia.50 
2. Road Networks 
The lack of infrastructure in Balochistan extends to 
the road network as well.  In order to fully capitalize on 
the transport of goods and services to neighboring markets, 
adequate road and rail networks need to be in place.  To 
address this issue, Pakistan has embarked on a number of 
projects to transform largely rural, dirt roads into modern 
                     
50 Pakalert, Destabalizing Baluchistan, Fracturing Pakistan. 




thoroughfares capable of high-speed transport of goods.51  
Figure 3 provides a graphic of existing and plans major 
road projects, highlighting the current deficiencies in 
connecting Gwadar with the other major urban centers of 
Pakistan. The continued Baloch perceptions of 
marginalization as the central government pursues its own 
interests contribute the frustration and continued 
insurgency.  Also important is the issue of international 
border crossing points and the measures that are required 
for the effective control of cross-border traffic. 52  
Figure 3 also brings up two more items of concern 
relating to Balochistan.  First is the Iranian construction 
of a wall along the Iran–Pakistan border from Taftan (near 
the Afghanistan border) to Mand (about 100 Km north of 
Gwadar).  Although built on the premise of inhibiting 
illegal border crossing and drug smuggling, the Baloch are 
concerned about its effect on tribal/family ties, much like 
the splitting of families that occurred with the 
construction of the Berlin Wall and the divide between 
North and South Korea.53  With a lack of political voice, 




                     
51 Asian Development Bank, "Balochistan Road Development Sector 
Project: Pakistan,” Asian Development Bank, 2008, 
http://pid.adb.org/pid/LoanView.htm?projNo=34333&seqNo=01&typeCd=3. 
52 Marshuk Ali Shah, "2nd Euro-Asian Road Transport Conference,” 
International Road Transport Union, October 7, 2003, 
http://www.iru.org/en_events_2003_tehran_marshuk_ali_shah. 
53 PTI "Iran erecting wall along the border with Pakistan,” Outlook 
India.com, March 2, 2007, 
http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?455022. 
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insurgency to oppose the construction, making the Baloch 
problem a multi-national concern and further destabilizing 
the region.54   
The second concern is the distinct lack of any road 
networks connecting Balochistan and Afghanistan.  This has 
a two-fold effect since it is an already porous border and 
is still largely uncontrolled which makes it easier to 
transport illicit goods (drugs, people and weapons), as 
well as preventing easy access for goods between 
Afghanistan, Central Asia and Russia and Gwadar Port.  If 
land transportation must rely on movement to Quetta and 
then south to Gwadar or Karachi, the increase in distance 
and time makes this situation less favorable and therefore, 
makes Chabahar Port a more reasonable option.  In this 
vein, recent discussions among Islamabad, Kabul and Tehran 
have led to a proposed agreement for the construction of a 
road linking Gwadar to Saindak (near the Iran and 
Afghanistan border confluence) to alleviate this problem, 
but actual construction has yet to begin.55  If this road is 
constructed, the Baloch will lose any of the bargaining 
power they may have, as well as invite a harsh backlash 
from the central government in retribution for their 
perceived losses.  In their multifaceted campaign, the 
Baloch are attacking road construction crews to deter its 
completion.  The issue is made more problematic in that 
 
                     
54 Chris Zambelis, "Insurrection in Iranian Balochistan,” The 
Jamestown Foundation, January 11, 2008, 
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373892%20. 
55 Syed Fazl-e-Haider, "Balochistan: Challenges and Opportunties,” 
Experts Meeting on Afghanistan and Regional Stabilisation, (Rome: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009, 1-17), 12. 
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many on the road crews are foreign nationals, bringing into 
light the potential for foreign intervention, which will be 
discussed in Chapter IV.56 
 
Figure 3: Existing and Proposed Road Network in 
Balochistan.57 
                     
56 B. Raman, "Baloch Freedom Fighters Attack Nuclear Establishment,” 
South Asia Analysis Group, May 17, 2006, 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers19%5Cpaper1801.html. 
57 Marshuk Ali Shah, “2nd Euro-Asian Road Transport Conference.” 
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3. Rail Networks 
According to the Figure 4, the promised railway 
connecting Gwadar with China has yet to be completed by the 
projected 2007 date.58  A recent meeting between China and 
Pakistan reaffirmed mutual desire for the completion of 
said rail network.59 However, akin to similar infrastructure 
development projects in Balochistan, the local population 
continues to hamper efforts against these projects by 
blowing up trains and sections of track, and by harassing 
construction crews.60  Figure 4 further reinforces the 
limiting commerce routes from neighboring countries and 
from Quetta, the provincial capital. It is easier to 
transport goods to Karachi than to Gwadar, further 
contributing to the slow economy of the region and the lack 
of wealth and jobs to the vast majority of Baloch.  As with 
all of the other land transportation issues, the need for 
safe and efficient access from Gwadar Port to the myriad of 
markets in the region is paramount to the significance of 
Balochistan.  
                     
58 Daily Balochistan Express, "Railroad system will be ready in 
three years time, says Governor,” Gwadar News, February 17, 2004, 
http://www.gwadarnews.com/newsdetail.asp?newsID=48. 
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Figure 4: Current Railway Network of Balochistan.61 
                     





Chapter II illustrates the importance of Balochistan 
as it relates to planned or existing road, rail and 
pipeline networks.  At this point, it is clear that the 
location of Balochistan is ideally suited for development 
and modernization.  With a number of interests from 
neighboring countries in both the resources available as 
well as the ability to quickly and cheaply transfer these 
resources, there is no shortage of investment opportunity 
for the Baloch.  As Central Asia, the Middle East and South 
Asia continue to develop economically, there will be a 
parallel interest in getting their goods to global markets 
as well and access from foreign investors to these 
production centers.  Finally, as these countries expand, 
the need for exponential increases in energy will follow 
along with the need for cheap and efficient access to 
global markets for the sale of surplus energy, all of which 
indicate the strategic importance of Balochistan in regards 
to international commerce and economics.  
Chapter II also exposes the importance of the human 
terrain as the Baloch rebel against uninvited outside 
intervention.  As more countries and organizations become 
involved in Balochistan, there is a parallel increase in 
the danger that these projects could lead to an 
international incident as the Baloch continue to target 
workers and projects, regardless of country of origin.  
With billions of dollars and government reputations on the 
line, it stands to reason that increasing pressures will be 
placed on the Pakistani government to remedy the situation, 
or face the loss of revenue and status on the world stage.  
 32 
With Pakistan’s history of harsh treatment of the Baloch 
during past insurgencies, it stands to reason that it is 
only a matter of time before large-scale repercussions are 
emplaced by the Pakistani military, further devolving the 
Baloch. 
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III. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF RESOURCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter III will explore the importance of the 
abundance of natural resources that exist in Balochistan.  
As previously mentioned, the three factors of people, 
terrain and resources in Balochistan are intrinsically 
linked.  Chapter II provided an overview of the terrain and 
its importance to trade and economics.  The culminating 
aspects to the untold potential for this region lies in the 
vast amount of valuable natural resources coupled with the 
importance of suitable deep-water port access to the global 
market.  The Gwadar Port project is included in this 
chapter because the impetus for the construction of Gwadar 
is due to the extraction of resources.  Chapter III 
highlights this connection and the significance of the fact 
that it is not a Pakistani led project.  Instead, the 
Gwadar Port project is fully financed and supported by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a means for exporting 
natural gas from the vast reserves found 1952.  This 
important factor helps explain the level and duration of 
insurgency by the Baloch discussed in Chapter IV.  
B. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF GWADAR PORT TO PAKISTANI 
ECONOMICS 
According to Robert Looney, the Pakistani economy has 
long suffered from underdevelopment and a lack of active 
participation in the global market.62  The current project 
of the Gwadar port facility in the southwestern province of 
                     
62 Robert E. Looney, "Pakistan's Progress Toward Economic Freedom,” 
Contemporary South Asia, June 1, 1997: 79-98. 
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Balochistan is meant to invigorate the Pakistani economy.  
The port, located near the entrance to the Straits of 
Hormuz, is expected to become a major hub for international 
trade in and around the Indian Ocean as well as a major 
gateway to Central Asia, especially for the export of 
Central Asian natural gas and oil.  The port is also 
strategically located to serve as a shipping site for 
Pakistani natural gas, which is mostly located in 
Balochistan.  With the planned influx of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into the area, Pakistan could become a 
major world conduit for petro-chemical trade and greatly 
stimulate its economic growth.  Of particular interest is 
how access to world markets and globalization could become 
a stabilizing factor in a region of Pakistan that has 
experienced widespread dissent and violence since their 
founding in 1947.63 
The modern world economy is dominated by the need for 
energy, especially fossil fuels, which power everything 
from transportation to agriculture.  The Gwadar port could 
provide access to vast reserves of Central Asian natural 
gas and oil, whose “market access is hindered by political 
and geographic conditions, including continued Russian 
influence, limited access to waterways beyond the Caspian 
Sea, and limited export infrastructure.”64 Current estimates 
are that these reserves will match the combined oil 
reserves of Iraq and Kuwait and the natural gas reserves of 
                     
63 Dr. Sadia Nasir, "Stabilizing Balochistan!,” Pakistan Times, 2005, 
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Saudi Arabia.65  Countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan possess these reserves but are 
landlocked and have limited access to foreign markets.  
Further, they are still suffering the effects of their 
inclusion in the former Soviet economy that never developed 
an efficient export infrastructure for their energy 
resources, instead focusing on domestic consumption.66  The 
December 2002 agreement between the governments of 
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to construct a 
pipeline that would carry oil from Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan to Gwadar provides an example of Central Asian 
initiatives, highlighting the importance of Gwadar Port.67   
Gazprom and a few other Russian companies have, 
through infrastructural investment along with political and 
economic deals, developed a virtual monopoly on the 
purchase, transportation and sale of Central Asian natural 
gas and oil to outside markets.68  These Russian companies 
exploit their position through practices such as buying 
Central Asian gas at “one-quarter to one-third of market 
prices in Europe and then resell[ing] [that] gas at market 
rates.”69  These practices have created strong incentives in 
Europe to bypass Russian intermediaries by building new 
pipelines that would transport Central Asian oil and gas to 
the world market as depicted in Figure 5.  These pipelines 
would allow for the competitive sale of these resources on 
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the world market, greatly benefiting the producers as well 
as those countries through which the pipelines would run, 
due to the substantial transit fees they would collect.70,71  
The corresponding increase in the price of Central Asian 
hydrocarbons would drive additional FDI in the 
“exploration, development, extraction, and production” of 
these as yet largely untapped reserves.72 
 
Figure 5: Current and Proposed Gas and Oil Pipelines From 
Central Asia.73 
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This situation has led to intense competition among 
regional countries that possess easy access to world 
markets through their deep-water ports.  Due to their 
location, Iran and Pakistan present the best solutions for 
getting these reserves to the sea with the shortest 
possible pipelines, with Gwadar being the closest and most 
convenient warm water port to the Caspian region.74  Both 
countries are pursuing major port development projects with 
accompanying transportation infrastructure to link them to 
the Central Asian republics in order to compete for the 
lucrative business of exporting their gas and oil.75  Figure 
6 illustrates how the location of Gwadar is ideally suited 
to meet these needs.   
The importance of Gwadar Port also extends beyond 
energy resources since Russia also dominates all of the 
other aspects of trade to and from Central Asia.  Although 
less profitable than the energy extraction and export 
business, trade in other products, such as the main cash 
crop of cotton, to and from Central Asian markets also 
represents a substantial amount of potential profit for any 
country that can open a secure route for that trade that is 
relatively cheaper than existing routes through Russia.76  
The Pakistanis hope to capture this trade and even envision 
Gwadar Port as the future primary transit point for Russian 
                     
74 International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in 
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trade goods moving to and from South and East Asia and the 
Middle East.77  The potential profits from this trade serve 
as an additional incentive for the competing Iranian and 
Pakistani port projects.78 
 
Figure 6: Strategic location of Gwadar and Possible Oil 
Lines Through the Region.79 
                     
77 Haider, “Balochis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port,” 100. 
78 Starr, “A Partnership for Central Asia.” 
79 Black, "Gwadar,” Health Advice for Healthy Living, August 2, 2008, 
http://healthforadvice.com/pakistan/gwadar.aspx. 
 39 
C. REGIONAL COMPETITION: GWADAR AND CHABAHAR 
The advantages of Gwadar Port are clear, and in the 
absence of competition, the Baloch could well use its 
importance to their advantage.  Unfortunately for the 
Pakistanis, a similar port project is underway at nearby 
Chabahar, Iran.  This project, financed predominately by 
Indian companies, is well underway and is not meeting the 
same difficulties as those encountered in Gwadar.  With the 
advantage of road development linking the port with the 
Ring Road in Afghanistan, Chabahar is poised to take the 
forefront in maritime commerce in the region.  
The Gwadar port and its Iranian competitor, the 
Chabahar port, are located a mere 110 miles apart and are 
directly competing for access to the same markets, 
evidenced by the transportation networks being constructed 
and enhanced from both ports to Afghanistan, the most 
direct path to Central Asia from the south.80  This rivalry 
is a major concern to Pakistani officials, who have stated 
that success of the “Chabahar port would inflict a huge 
financial setback for Pakistan.”81  Iran has been attempting 
to tip the balance in its favor through measures such as 
giving Afghanistan substantially reduced port fees when 
using the Chabahar port.82  Pakistan has countered by 
granting “preferential trade status” to Afghanistan.83   
Yet the emerging rivalry is much more than an Iran 
versus Pakistan rivalry as each of the port projects is 
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largely driven by FDI from one of the two emerging Asian 
financial giants, China and India. Chinese investment 
accounts for over 80% of the capital flowing into the 
Gwadar port project, the total cost of which is estimated 
at $850 million, and over 450 Chinese engineers and workers 
are providing the expertise to complete the majority of the 
construction.84  China is currently an important trading 
partner for Pakistan, and increased trade between the two 
countries is a major anticipated benefit of the completed 
port.  Annual trade between the two countries has risen 
steadily to over $2.4 billion, which is equivalent to 
roughly half of the trade volume between China and India.85  
Pakistani business interests are advocating preferential 
economic treatment for Chinese companies operating through 
Gwadar, in the hope of stimulating trade between the two 
countries.86  The Pakistanis are also encouraging China to 
use Gwadar to facilitate trade to and from the western 
Chinese province of Xinjiang, which has recorded annual 
foreign trade of $4.8 billion and a GDP of $22.7 billion.87 
The Sino-Pakistani partnership is especially troubling 
to India, which has a long-standing geopolitical and 
military rivalry with Pakistan, which dates back to their 
partition in 1947.  The rivalry has encompassed three wars, 
and currently settled into an uneasy cold war between these 
two nuclear powers who still vigorously dispute the 
northern province of Jammu and Kashmir.88  The rivalry 
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between the two explains why India chose to finance the 
development of Chabahar and its associated transportation 
infrastructure, rather than collaborating with the 
Pakistanis and Chinese and pooling their resources in the 
development of Gwadar, which is closer, and therefore more 
convenient, to India.89  From a financial standpoint, this 
option would make more sense, however, due to security 
concerns relating to the use of Gwadar Port as a military 
naval base that will be more difficult to target, India 
will likely continue to eye this project with skepticism.   
Compounding this tension is the emerging geopolitical, 
military, and financial rivalry between India and China, 
fueled in part by competing Indian and Chinese interests 
and influence in Central Asia.90   
Another key component of this rivalry is that China’s 
establishment of a significant military presence in Gwadar 
and other friendly ports along the northern rim of the 
Indian Ocean, known as the “string of pearls” strategy, 
directly challenges India’s position in the area that India 
views as its rightful sphere of influence.91  As Figure 7 
depicts, China has made substantial headway in this 
endeavor, with projects surrounding India to gain access to 
the relatively untapped markets of Central, South and 
Southeast Asia.92  Both India and China import large amounts 
of their fossil fuels through the Straits of Hormuz, which 
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are only 250 miles from Gwadar, making China’s large naval 
base and listening post at Gwadar an important resource for 
safeguarding Chinese shipments and a serious threat to 
Indian shipments in the event of hostilities.93  Another 
sign of the growing tension between these two countries is 
China’s plans to use Gwadar as the starting point of a 
pipeline that would carry Middle Eastern oil into western 
China via an overland transit system, thereby mitigating 
China’s vulnerability to India’s military naval ability to 
close the Straits of Malacca to Chinese shipping.94 
 
Figure 7: China's String of Pearls.95 
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It is under these tense conditions that India is 
financing and providing engineers for the development and 
upgrading of Chabahar port and its associated 
transportation infrastructure reaching into Central Asia.96  
India and Iran have signed an agreement with Afghanistan to 
develop transportation infrastructure from Chabahar into 
Afghanistan and India committed $70 million to the 
construction of the Zaranj-Delaram Highway97, which was 
completed in January 2009.98  
In addition to the substantial economic benefits of 
being a major trade hub, especially as the gateway to 
Central Asian energy and trade, and the advantage of 
cementing Pakistan’s relationship with China, Gwadar also 
promises to draw significant FDI into the area.  Estimates 
of potential unnamed investors run as high as $8 billion, 
with the money used to develop various aspects of the 
infrastructure and economy needed to support large-scale 
operations and the influx of people to Gwadar Port.99  
Despite its inherent worth to Pakistan, the Gwadar port and 
its associated pipelines and other transportation 
infrastructure face serious internal challenges.  The 
primary obstacles are the native Baloch, the vast majority 
of whom oppose these developments. In order to understand 
the root causes of why the Baloch would oppose a project 
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that would benefit their province, one needs to examine the 
history if their incorporation into the state of Pakistan 
since 1947. 
D. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE INSURGENCY 
Throughout Pakistan’s history, scholars argue that the 
Baloch have been marginalized both financially and 
politically.100  Only one Baloch has ever held a major post 
in the national government, and the government of 
Balochistan itself is often run by non-Baloch installed by 
the central government.101 There have been six major 
insurgencies since the founding of Pakistan in 1947 with 
the first starting the day after Partition.  The Nation of 
Baluchistan was declared in 1947 when the British withdrew 
their colonies from South Asia and created the nation-
states of East and West Pakistan in conjunction with 
autonomy for India.  The government of Pakistan opposed 
their independence and invaded Balochistan, subduing the 
tribes and incorporated them into West Pakistan in 1948.102  
The next insurgency occurred in 1958 to maintain their 
pseudo-autonomy in response to One-Unit, which abolished 
all of West Pakistan’s provinces in favor a single, unified 
state to counter East Pakistan strength.103  Following the 
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end of martial law, 1963 brought the next round of 
insurgency as the leading tribes of the Bugti, Marri and 
Mengal Baloch rose up against the government’s military 
cantonments (numbering about 35) in Balochistan.104 Then in 
1971, East Pakistan, who also had grievance against the 
government, was able to successfully break away and form 
the nation of Bangladesh.105  West Pakistan (now simply 
Pakistan) was also having problems regarding the Kashmir 
area, with constant fighting with the Indian government 
along with Chinese interference.  With this going on, the 
most cohesive and violent insurgency was launched in 
Balochistan, lasting from 1973 to 1977.106  This uprising, 
involving over 20,000 insurgents, began with the state’s 
dissolution of Balochistan’s first democratically elected 
provincial government.107  The central government launched a 
full-scale military invasion of Balochistan with more than 
80,000 troops, which eventually crushed the insurgency 
after the deaths of hundreds of Baloch.108   
Baloch opposition to the center continues to remain 
potent but was expressed mainly though political means 
until 2002 when the current insurgency began.  President 
Musharraf’s 2001 announcement of the plan to develop a 
massive, deepwater port at Gwadar was viewed by the Baloch 
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as another step in the center’s plan to colonize 
Balochistan.  This perception may seem strange considering 
that Balochistan is a province of Pakistan, but looking at 
the method of incorporation into Pakistan and their 
exclusion from power sharing in the center, the Baloch have 
reason to feel marginalized by what they perceive as a 
pseudocolonial power.109  Additionally, in an arrangement 
that mirrors classical colonialism, the central government 
has controlled the extraction of Balochistan’s vast energy 
resources, with the Baloch receiving only token royalties 
from their sale.110  In Frederic Grare’s paper, he contends 
that this lack of political opportunity and unseen benefits 
from the government in regard to the natural gas fields 
have led the Baloch to feel a level of dispossession and 
desperation, thus explaining their constant revolt against 
the government.111  This fear of colonization is further 
reinforced by the military occupation of not only Gwadar 
and key natural gas fields, but the continued existence of 
the other cantonments that sparked the fourth insurrection.   
Based on this history, it is not surprising that when 
Nawabzada Balach Marri, a Baloch militancy leader in the 
current insurgency, was asked, “Why are you opposing 
development activities, including mega projects like the 
Gwadar deep sea port, in Balochistan?” he responded, “We do 
not consider … Islamabad’s plans, focused on their own 
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interests at our cost, as development … These actions 
threaten the national identity of the Baloch nation and 
amount to destruction, not development.”112  This comment 
betrays another Baloch concern that strengthens the 
opposition, which is the fact that the forecast influx of 1 
to 2.5 million non-Baloch workers to run Gwadar once the 
port is fully operational will make the Baloch a minority 
in their own province.113  This lends to the fear that the 
Baloch will lose the small amount of semiautonomy allowed 
for the past few decades.  Gwadar further ties Baloch 
grievances together because it would serve, along with its 
many other functions, as an export site for Balochistan’s 
natural gas, from which the Baloch have no reason to 
believe they would meaningfully profit.114 
The trigger for the current insurgency was Musharraf’s 
insistence on moving forward with the Gwadar project over 
the objections of the Baloch.  In 2002, he engineered 
elections that brought politicians to power in Balochistan 
who would support him, which led to street protests in 
opposition to the Gwadar Port initiative.115  Musharraf 
characterized the Baloch insurgency as inspired and fueled 
by India in order to undermine its legitimacy as an 
expression of the discontent of the people of Balochistan 
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and invited the Chinese to come and begin the project 
anyway.116,117  In response, the Balochistan Liberation Army 
(BLA) was formed and began targeting government buildings, 
communication infrastructure, natural gas fields, army 
units, and the Gwadar port, clearly communicating its 
intent to strike at and disrupt the extension of the 
center’s power into Balochistan.118   
The violence escalated throughout 2003 and 2004, and 
reached a high point in the events surrounding the alleged 
rape of a Baloch doctor by an army captain at the Sui 
natural gas field, the largest in Balochistan.119  The 
Baloch demanded justice, and Musharraf responded by 
deploying more military power to the area to deter any 
attempt at armed reprisal by the Baloch.  This deployment 
was followed by the threat that the Baloch “[would] not 
know what hit them” if they did not stop shooting.120  The 
Baloch responded by sending militants to Sui, and the 
resulting clash with government troops left 67 dead.121  
Musharraf still refused to try the captain for the rape, 
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but instead announced that he was innocent.122  The Baloch 
took this as a direct insult to their honor as a people, 
and the support for the insurgency strengthened.123  In 
2004, three Chinese engineers were killed and nine more 
were wounded when their van was struck by a car bomb en 
route to Gwadar.124  The BLA has continued to target the 
port along with fossil fuel extraction and transportation 
facilities, stating that they choose these targets because 
they “believe the rest of Pakistan is exploiting their 
mineral and oil and gas resources.”125  Moreover, the 
movement is not isolated; on the contrary, “it appears as 
if ordinary Baloch are willing to support any entity that 
challenges what is perceived to be a colonial army engaged 
in blatant self-aggrandizement.”126 
E. THE EFFECTS OF THE INSURGENCY 
Obviously, a violent insurgency with a history of 
attacking energy transportation resources is a strong 
deterrent to FDI.127  So far, Pakistan has responded to the 
insurgency with intense repression involving widespread 
arrests and even “disappearing” of political activists.  
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This strategy has been relatively successful due to the 
disjointed and erratic nature of the current insurgency, 
which has nowhere near the level of organization of the 
1973 insurgency.128  However, there are other, more 
effective measures that the government could take to quell 
the violence and bring long-term stability and security to 
Balochistan.  Exploring these measures is important, since 
Islamabad cannot always rely on a disorganized insurgency 
or the effectiveness of its own coercive apparatus to 
prevent catastrophic damage to the rapidly expanding and 
increasingly important infrastructure in Balochistan.   
The central government needs to convince the Baloch 
that the port will substantially benefit them and that they 
therefore have a stake in ensuring its success.  Training 
Baloch for the technical jobs that will be available in the 
expanding economic zone around Gwadar and then ensuring 
their preferential hiring over nonlocal workers would 
greatly alleviate the frustrations fueling the resistance.  
A final measure would be to compensate those displaced by 
the expansion of the port facilities, which should be 
easily achievable using the substantial revenues 
anticipated to flow in through the port.129 
F. THE BENEFITS OF GWADAR 
The development of Gwadar and its related 
transportation infrastructure promises many benefits for 
the people of Pakistan as a whole and Balochistan in 
particular.  Proven through repeated success stories, 
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countries that have integrated into the world market 
experience faster growth and reduced poverty compared with 
countries that have pursued isolationist or protectionist 
policies.130  During the 1990s, less globalized countries 
averaged negative growth rates while more globalized 
countries averaged growth rates of 5 percent.131  Opening up 
Gwadar port as a free-trade zone, which has been advocated 
by Pakistani corporations, will be a strong incentive for 
increased trade, thereby allowing Pakistan to “do what it 
does best and trade for the rest.”132,133 This opening to 
increased international competition will undoubtedly cause 
some localized hardships within Pakistan, but the long term 
benefits to the Pakistani economy and people as a whole 
will greatly outweigh the short-term costs to a small 
segment of the population.134  In the face of Baloch desires 
for autonomy however, this loss of control and infringement 
on their culture is unacceptable, leading to appeals to the 
U.S to stop their aid to Pakistan as they contend that the 
aid is being used to finance operations in Balochistan.135   
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Experience shows that “[c]ompetition stimulates 
innovation and offers incentives to adopt efficiencies,” 
which in the end will make the Pakistani economy stronger 
and more competitive.136  Increased trade with the booming 
Chinese economy will provide many benefits, one of the most 
important being decreased reliance on trade with the United 
States  The United States currently accounts for roughly 
80% of Pakistani textile exports, Pakistan’s number one 
export sector.  This heavy reliance on a single market 
proved disastrous when a recent decrease in U.S. purchases 
of Pakistani textiles caused the layoff of 48,000 Pakistani 
workers.137  Opening new markets in a rapidly expanding 
economy like China is key to insulating Pakistan against 
the harmful effects of overreliance on a single market.  
Perhaps most importantly, Gwadar promises to greatly 
increase the amount of FDI in Pakistan.  This is important 
for a number of reasons, first among them being that 
“globalization of production now significantly outstrips 
trade as an organizing feature of the international 
economy.”138  Thus, the only way to be truly integrated in 
the global economy is to attract multinational corporations 
(MNCs) and their FDI.  The liability presented by a lack of 
FDI and MNC activity in a country is highlighted by the 
experience of the former Soviet republics.  Their 
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deficiency in these two areas caused them to fall farther 
and farther behind the West throughout the 1970s and 
1980s.139  MNCs facilitate technological advances through 
inter-firm alliances that spread the costs of research and 
development.  Attempting to compete with MNCs and their 
access to global resources while maintaining an 
isolationist stance is doomed to failure.140  FDI provides 
developing countries “access to the technical-financial 
potential of [MNCs] while preserving national sovereignty,” 
and this is exactly what Pakistan needs to grow and compete 
in the world market.141  Gwadar’s role in attracting 
additional FDI is critical because Pakistan’s ratio of per 
capita FDI inflow throughout the 1990s was less than 5 
percent of the world average.142  Without a significant 
increase in FDI, Pakistan will continue to fall behind its 
competitors.  Gwadar port holds enormous potential for the 
future development of Pakistan, but only if the Pakistanis 
can find a way to spread its benefits among the people of 
Balochistan. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Chapter III discussed the vast natural resources that 
exist in Balochistan.  It further showed how the extraction 
of these resources is meeting increasing resistance from 
those that claim the rightful ownership of these resources 
in the face of their central governments extraction 
policies.  Due to an apparent inability to compromise and 
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perceived lack of political mechanisms to achieve their 
demands, the Baloch have instead embarked on a mission of 
sabotage and terror, against not only the Pakistani 
military, but also extending to include violence against 
the foreign workers involved in the various projects.  This 
situation of rich rewards and multiple claimants will only 
serve to prolong the issue at hand.  By involving powerful 
international actors in this situation, the jockeying for 
these natural resources could escalate into a broader 
dilemma, thereby increasing the strategic importance of 
Balochistan in matters of international security and 
regional stability. 
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IV. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF MOTIVE AND AGENDAS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The final chapter of this thesis investigates the role 
of the Baloch and their responses to the new global and 
national interest in their homeland.  How are the Baloch 
leaders are attempting to expand their struggle onto the 
international stage in order to bring attention to their 
cause is also focused upon.  Through repeated failures to 
achieve autonomy and the formation of Greater Balochistan, 
they are now reaching out with increased fervor to the 
international community.143  Examples of this are notable in 
their membership in the UNPO (Unrepresented Nations and 
Peoples Organization) as a mechanism to appeal to the 
United Nations (U.N.).144  Not content with a single course 
of action, the Baloch are increasing adopting a plan of 
direct appeals to the United States patronage in a tit-for-
tat strategy.145  Although commendable for their ingenuity, 
such actions, if successful in pulling in foreign military 
assistance, stand to radically destabilize an already 
unstable environment.  By introducing foreign militaries 
and agendas into local affairs, the Baloch leaders may 
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inadvertently make their situation worse by advancing it to 
a point from which they are unable to retain any semblance 
of control. 
B. AUTONOMY AND THE PRESERVATION OF CULTURE 
As described in Chapters II and III, the Baloch have 
resisted both Pakistani and foreign governments’ 
intervention or interference since Partition in 1947.  
Their staunch desire to maintain their identity, remain 
independent, and provide the prospect of a better future 
for their children continues to motivate the insurgency.146  
With little education and limited prospects for the future, 
control over the sought after terrain and resources of 
Balochistan is the most powerful tool available to the 
Baloch leadership.147   
Parallels can be drawn to other tribal systems 
throughout history, and sadly, history tends to show that 
the tribal societies ultimately will lose.  Whether that 
loss is through assimilation (the Celts of the British 
Isles), diffusion (the natives of the Caribbean), removal 
(the Native Americans displacement the reservations), 
subjugation (the natives of Southeast Asia), or 
extermination (the Inca’s and Aztec’s), the end result is 
loss of land, tradition and autonomy.  In each of these 
examples, the tribes or clans resisted, often through 
protracted wars that decimated their populations and left 
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enduring rivalries and bias’ that exist long after the wars 
ended.  On the reverse, according to Ralph Peters, “ethnic 
cleansing” through dramatic re-drawing of borders and 
creation of new states may work best for bringing peace in 
a region.148  He argues that Pakistan needs to not only give 
up Balochistan to a newly independent Greater Balochistan, 
but also their Pashtun regions need to join Afghanistan, 
leaving the Punjabi and Sindhi regions to form the new 
extent of Pakistan.149 
With such proposals and knowledge at their disposal, 
the Baloch continue to persist in their defiance in the 
face of overwhelming odds. Independence of Bangladesh in 
1947 also provides an example to emulate.  Although 
Bangladesh was able to break free from Pakistan and form 
their own country, the circumstances surrounding their 
situation were completely different in two critical ways.  
First, the physical separation was a key component and 
second was the near-overt support from the Indian military 
toward the East Pakistani resistance.150  The first is 
obviously out of Balochistan’s hands and the second, while 
an option, becomes less so as time goes by.  There have 
been rumors of Indian support to Baloch insurgency in the 
past, and continued distrust in this arena, threatens an 
already tenuous relationship between these countries.151  
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However, with the current Gwadar and Chabahar Port 
competition discussed in Chapter III, there is the danger 
that overt Indian support to Balochistan could have 
spillover effects in such regions as the Jammu and 
Kashmir.152  India’s support for independent Balochistan 
will not and cannot be along the lines of support provided 
to Bangladesh in 1971. 
To take this point further, the Pakistani state cannot 
allow the Baloch, with their presence in nearly half the 
country (geographically), to dictate the rules of 
governance.  It would set a bad precedence for other 
factions in such places as the Northwest Frontier and Jammu 
and Kashmir.  With their history of autocratic or pseudo-
autocratic leaders, to allow the peoples of Pakistan a 
voice in a sudden manner could undermine current democratic 
initiatives.153  The rationale behind this is by examining 
the often-violent upheaval that many nations in South and 
Southeast Asia experienced following the rapid end of 
European colonization.  As time progresses, more elements 
stated in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan are being 
implemented, such as more rights and privileges to its 
citizens, as well as greater support from the center.   
With this trend, the governments point to the insurgents is 
that they need more time and insurgency only serves to make 
the process longer as precious resources are stripped away 
to deal with insurgency vice infrastructure and social 
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development.154  In a region where random violence against 
all non-Baloch is possible, there is a requirement for 
additional military and police forces to provide safety to 
the workers.  Added to these costs are the costs of 
repairing the damages associated with pipeline, rail and 
roadway detonations along with the interruption in services 
or transit, all of which amounts to substantial loss of 
time and money.  Furthermore, the constant threat of 
violence makes contracting out these services more 
difficult and expensive.  Finally, with the abundance of 
valuable natural resources in Balochistan, Pakistan has an 
increased reason to hold on to the region.  Also with 
increasing pressures and attention on the region due to the 
current War on Terrorism, a dangerous game of international 
politics is underway that could drag the region into a 
dramatic upswing in violence. In other words, the Pakistani 
Central government, civilian or military led, has very 
little incentives to let Baloch insurgency succeed. In 
fact, due to the War on Terror and growing energy needs, 
the state is motivated to end the insurgency as soon as 
possible, which might have not been the case in the earlier 
decades, when the pressures were purely domestic.  
International presence in the region places greater 
pressure to find a solution. 
C. INDIRECT APPEALS FOR SUPPORT 
The UNPO is an organization that strives to provide a 
voice to the various cultures and societies around the 
globe that are being subjugated or marginalized by their 
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government.155  The Baloch are attempting to appeal to the 
global society in an effort to bring U.N. or other 
international attention to their conflict.156  Following the 
Cold War, the U.N. has taken increased interest in becoming 
involved with similar groups that can provide some level of 
economic or strategic advantage to the U.N.157  Examples of 
this lie in their involvement in independence movements in 
the Western Sahara, Namibia and East Timor.158  The U.N. has 
received a great deal of criticism over the Peacekeeping 
Operations, with some pointing out that its involvement 
does not solve the root problems, instead merely dragging 
out the crisis and causesing more death and destruction.159  
Further challenges to U.N. Peacekeeping Operations lie 
in defining government legitimacy and respect by all 
parties involved.160  This point is particularly applicable 
to the Balochistan situation.  Although there is clearly a 
legitimate government in Pakistan, the Baloch routinely 
waffle in their support of the center or deny recognition 
of the government, which makes it difficult for foreign 
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agencies to accurately gauge the level of mistreatment 
being suffered.  An example of this lies in the fact that 
the Baloch have been involved in state politics, with their 
absences being a combination of dismissal or conscious 
disassociation.  
The result of this waffling is evident in the marked 
increase in civilians, military and rebel deaths and 
injuries in Balochistan stemming from the increased attacks 
against the railways and pipelines discussed in Chapter II 
and the resultant backlash from the military.161  Figure 5 
provides an example of the increasing violent incidents.  
Nearly seven times the number of people were killed in the 
first month following a recent breaking of the cease-fire 
agreement between the Baloch revolutionaries and the state 
(numbers in parentheses are the figures for December 
2008).162  These figures are further supported by reputable 
news coverage for the area, and although actual figures 
will likely never surface, the broad consensus appears to 
point to the increasing violence.163  
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Figure 8: Casualty Figures in Violent Incidents in 
Pakistan, January 2009.164 
Although appeals to the U.N. may seem like a logical 
choice for a group of people to pursue in light of their 
organic inability to solve the problem, there are a number 
of issues that present themselves.  Following the end of 
the Cold War, the U.N. increased its Peacekeeping 
Operations (PKO).  Initial entry into this foray came with 
expected complications, and although there is a great deal 
of information coming from the U.N. regarding lessons-
learned and improved capability, the amount of harsh 
criticism is also increasing, coming from states were 
peacekeeping operations occurred, as well as scholars and 
academics.165  As noted by the Heritage Foundation, U.N. PKO 
is increasing in both numbers of places involved, as well 
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as level of danger for the peacekeeping forces.166  The 
article points to an increasing trend in violence, as more 
parties become involved in the crisis, as well as increased 
targeting of the foreigners in an effort to either curry 
favor or remove the additional threat.167  In other words, 
if the Baloch are successful in gaining U.N. attention, the 
level and duration of violence currently experienced will 
likely increase leading to the inevitable U.N. withdrawal.  
Then the Baloch are likely to either be in the same or 
worse position than they were prior to the U.N. arrival.168    
Further challenges are noted and corollaries are seen 
in the recent U.N. mission to Haiti, which presents an 
exemplary case of problematic U.N. Mission.  A synopsis of 
the challenges reported by The Center on International 
Cooperation in Haiti identified three areas that result in 
poor or absent cooperation between certain ethnic/tribal 
groups and the central government.169  The first is when 
there is no mechanism for resolving conflict, refer to the 
Social Movement Theory of Charles Tilly defined earlier 
which identified this same point.170  Specifically, the lack 
of involvement in state politics through legitimate means 
will often lead politically minded people to resort to 
methods that are more violent in an effort to make the 
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state meet their demands.  The second aspect in this case 
was the resistance of Haitian elites toward state reform.  
In this case, although measures were adopted, the perceived 
loss of local power led local elites to resist in order to 
maintain their status.  The final point centers on the 
perception of a state weak in resources and economy and 
widely viewed as corrupt, which caused a lack of faith in 
the government’s ability to follow through with their 
promises. 
With all of these points currently evident in 
Balochistan and Pakistan, it is clear that Balochistan may 
face similar difficulties following U.N. involvement.  
While the U.N. claims success in a similar tribal/ethnic 
clash in Cambodia, the ongoing violence and underpinnings 
of resentment are clearly still manifesting in the area.171  
These are just two of the many cases that highlight the 
dysfunction of the U.N. regarding peacekeeping operations, 
providing further proof that the Baloch should strongly 
reconsider their choice of international sponsor and the 
ramifications of what could happen if the U.N. decides to 
forcibly involve themselves in Balochistan.172  While there 
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East Timor that ended hostilities in 2002 and created a 
peace that stands to this day, the overall record is 
mixed.173 
D. DIRECT APPEALS FOR SUPPORT 
Successive failures to gain full autonomy have led the 
Baloch to court foreign powers to provide either financial 
or material support.174 As discussed earlier in the chapter, 
with little prospect of Indian support coming, the Baloch 
appear to be pursuing a tactic of enticing the United 
States to support their cause.175  This has placed the 
United States in a somewhat awkward position, as Washington 
has spent, and continues to spend, billions supporting the 
Pakistani government.176  For example, in 2010, Washington 
set aside $1.5 billion for military and economic aid to 
Pakistan.177  These payments are now being questioned in 
light of a perceived lack of return on investment in the 
Global War on Terror following the U.S. military raid that 
killed Osama bin Laden outside of Islamabad.178  
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Meanwhile, Balochistan continues to serve as a primary 
conduit for military resources to support the current War 
on Terrorism based out of Afghanistan.  The loss of this 
supply route would greatly complicate the logistics for the 
U.S. and Pakistani operations. Complicating matters 
further, with the growing voice of the Baloch in 
international arenas, the issue of which “subjugated” 
peoples to support and the ramifications for not 
supporting, are having an increased effect on world opinion 
and policy decision-making.179  Finally, with China already 
having a strong foothold in perhaps the best strategic 
location in Balochistan at Gwadar, there is the added 
danger of an international incident that could quickly 
blossom out of control under the right circumstances. 
Making this entire situation even more disturbing, the 
Baloch appear to be hedging their bets to a certain degree 
by also seeking assistance from the Russians.180  There is 
historical precedent for this move as the Soviets courted 
the Baloch during the Soviet–Afghanistan War that lasted 
from December 1979 to February 1989.  In their efforts to 
access the Indian Ocean, the Soviets promised military and 
other forms of aid to the Baloch in return for their 
assistance in southern Afghanistan and Soviet access to 
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Gwadar during the Cold War.181  Although the Cold War is 
over, there are still residual feelings of distrust between 
Washington and Moscow in the region, and when combined with 
increasing Chinese interest in the region, the potential 
for some form of international crisis is exacerbated.  
Although evidence of support is inconclusive, an 
interesting WikiLeaks cable stated that the Russians are 
continuing to support Baloch insurgency, although for what 
purpose is yet to be ascertained.182 
E. INCONSISTENT MESSAGES 
With the attention focused on the headline-grabbing 
appeals, along with the accusations and counteraccusations 
between the Pakistani government and the Baloch leadership, 
some interesting points seem to fall through the cracks.  A 
great deal of time is spent on the Baloch insurgent group’s 
blogs regarding the fight against colonialism, with some 
claiming that Pakistan has enslaved the Baloch in the 
British colonial fashion.183 Other groups claim that the 
Pakistan modifies their practices to ensure that the Baloch 
do not have a voice in government, and eliminate any 
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political personage that threatens their control.184  With 
the recent history of the subcontinent, notions of 
colonialism provide an excellent touchstone for evoking 
images of oppression and subjugation. However, their claims 
that they are fighting against the Pakistani central 
government, along with foreign developers in Balochistan, 
in order to ensure that they do not return to this awful 
past start to fall apart when one examines the actions of 
the leadership.  It is difficult to state in one breath 
that a group is fighting for autonomy for its people, and 
then in the next breath invite foreign militaries to come 
in and assist your group in this endeavor.185  Although the 
military aspects are obvious, having a new sponsor who is 
physically and emotionally detached could actually worsen 
the situation for the Baloch. The development of 
Balochistan could turn into a combination of business 
enterprise and strategic posturing, with the desires of the 
Baloch taking a backseat to these endeavors.186 
By examining the dilemmas surrounding foreign 
assistance, combined with their strategic terrain and 
geographical location and their abundance of valuable 
natural resources, a slightly different picture begins to 
develop.  The Baloch leadership stands to amass untold 
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wealth (which may or may not be redistributed to the 
masses) by gaining their autonomy.187  With promises of 
untold wealth and the backing of the United States, it 
would appear that the Baloch insurgency has laid their 
existence at the feet of hope.188  The hope for more say in 
their development and government, along with the hope for 
better education and access to technical seeking jobs would 
lead the Baloch to an almost vassal-like status to the 
United States for the prospect of far greater financial 
returns than their current situation.189  The trend in this 
direction can be seen in Washington’s past treatment of 
tribal or ethnic groups.  As the random levels of support 
for the Kurds during the 1990s and into the second invasion 
of Iraq show, discontented groups are supported by the 
United States so long as they provide some benefit, as the 
natural resources and Gwadar Port of Balochistan clearly 
would.190   
F. CONCLUSION 
Chapter IV has shown how the motives, both stated and 
suspected, make the Baloch an extremely dangerous wild 
card.  With increased interest in the region for the 
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aforementioned reasons, the Baloch stand to either make 
massive gains or face complete marginalization, with a 
multitude of gradations in between.  With the understanding 
of the treasure trove they are sitting on, it appears that 
the Baloch are determined to make a concerted effort to 
gain autonomy with the understanding that this is likely 
their last opportunity given the resource and political 
urgency facing the Pakistani state.   
With the world’s attention focused on the region and 
increasing animosity between Washington and Islamabad, the 
time is ripe for a partnership with the United States  
Barring that, a secondary option of getting the U.N. to 
embark on a mission would not likely garner immediate 
results; however, increased international pressures might 
force the Islamabad to alter their position on Balochistan.  
Whereas neither of these options is likely to happen, the 
fact that other countries are responding or paying 
attention to the Baloch attempts try and involve foreign 
governments in the pursuit of their goals indicates that 
the Baloch are of extreme significance regarding the future 
stability of the region.191 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
Taken individually, the three factors presented in 
this thesis, those of human and physical terrain, natural 
resources and local politics, are compelling in regards to 
strategic importance of Balochistan not only for Pakistan, 
but also for the entire region.  As technology continues to 
bring the peoples of the world closer together, it is safe 
to say that matters of regional importance will have ripple 
effects around the globe.  Modern politics are no longer 
limited to local grievances or cultural nuances.  The 
expanding global trade environment and increased 
international competition for resources drive for cheap 
production and new markets have set local politics aside in 
the interest of larger global political economy.   
With this rationale in mind, the significance of 
Balochistan is clear.  With its favorable terrain enabling 
rapid and easy access to the emerging markets and resources 
of Central Asia or as a land-bridge connecting the Middle 
East and South Asia, it has become of great interest to 
international players. This is apparent is the planned 
major rail, road and pipeline development projects as 
discussed in Chapter II.  The potential for a deep-water 
port in Gwadar is also of extreme importance in that it 
will allow for active competition in global markets along 
the sea-lanes as well as the ability to accommodate the 
massive influx of imports and exports that go hand-in-hand 
with this growth as pointed out by Robert Kaplan in his 
thought provoking book Monsoon.  
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Moving beyond the Balochistan terrain and its 
advantageous ability to facilitate the crossroads of 
commerce, the interest in this province is expounded with 
the addition of the vast natural resources that have such 
high global demand as shown in Chapter III.  Further, the 
sale of these resources promises untold economic gains for 
many years to come as globalization continues to increase 
in exponential fashion throughout developing countries.  
The rise of many east African and Southeast Asian countries 
from obscurity is intertwined with Gwadar Port and the 
opportunity that it provides as a mechanism for these 
nations to access each other as well the global market.  As 
such, the owner of these resources stands to gain not only 
in economic terms, but also through increased power and 
prestige in the region.   
The location and the presence of vast resources in 
Balochistan lead to the heightened interest in pacifying 
the region by the Pakistani government.  Not only would the 
nation’s increased economic status assist them in their 
enduring rivalry with India, but would also extend this 
elevated status into Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan.  
Further, by courting the rising Chinese power, they stand 
to either shed their reliance on American aid, or 
experience even greater gains as these two powers vie for 
power and influence in South Asia. 
Finally, the importance of Baloch in the achieving 
stability and national development in increasing global 
scrutiny elevates this region as strategically important on 
for Pakistan.  With their claims on the geography and 
resources of Balochistan, along with persistence to 
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maintain their cultural identity, their pursuit for 
autonomy creates a dangerous breeding ground for conflict 
as illustrated in their conflict-ridden integrative history 
with Pakistan.  In an ever-escalating fashion, the 
insurgent groups have demonstrated that no manner of person 
is safe, be the military, police, government employee, 
transportation worker or foreigner or even Baloch. All are 
caught between the center’s decision to tap into the 
region’s resources and the Baloch elite’s decisions not to 
allow them full access without them as intermediaries and 
sufficient reimbursement.  Such reckless behavior centering 
on absolutes and ultimatums could easily lead to some 
manner of governmental outrage where the Pakistani military 
moves in and instills harsh martial law again as they have 
done in the past.   
Harkening back to the previous insurgencies discussed 
in Chapter IV, the Pakistani government has made it clear 
that autonomy is not an option and that large-scale 
rebellion will only have the effect of military action and 
increased military presence.  In addition, an attack 
against foreign citizens, or against elite or high-status 
personnel, could create an international incident whereby 
foreign militaries arrive to exact revenge.  This situation 
could then spiral further, drawing in enemies and allies 
alike that are pursuing their own self-interests.  We are 
already seeing the potential for this in the attacks 
against the Chinese port workers along with warnings by the 
Baloch rebels that all foreigners (in this context 
referring to all non-Baloch) should immediately depart the 
region to avoid being caught in the crossfire. 
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In summation, the strategic importance of Balochistan 
lies in how the unknown of the Baloch and the Pakistani 
leadership will react to the known increasing international 
pressures in the pursuit of wealth and status.  The 
physical geography is not likely to change and will 
continue to be vital for overland transport and access to 
Afghanistan, Central Asia and Russia along with serving as 
a land-bridge between the Middle East and South Asia.  
Until alternate fuel sources are produced in an economical 
fashion and enter mass production and dissemination, the 
natural gas fields, along with the oil and mineral wealth, 
will continue to be sought by all of the countries in the 
region.  Therefore, the heart of the strategic importance 
of Balochistan is how the powerful nations of the world 
approach Balochistan, and how the Baloch react to these 
advances. 
B. READING THE TEA-LEAVES 
Global interest in the region of Balochistan is 
unlikely to decline anytime in the near future.  As South 
Asia continues to modernize at exponential rates, the need 
for energy will only increase.  With the current known 
locations of natural gas and petroleum as they are, India 
and China are likely to engage in dramatically increasing 
competition for access to these vital resources.  It is no 
surprise then that the natural gas fields in Pakistan and 
Central Asia are of given so much attention as control or 
influence of the source allows privileged access and lower 
prices.  Intrinsically tied to this is the transportation 
and refinement of these resources.  As discussed in Chapter 
II, the gross lack of mass transportation means or 
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infrastructure leads to a virtual clean-slate in 
Balochistan.  What this means for the region and interested 
parties is that the countries and / or corporations that 
can provide infrastructure development and service 
provision will likely experience a dramatic rise in 
preeminence in the region.  Along with this will be the 
corresponding rise in additional actors in the region who 
will have an impact on local and state politics.  In an 
already troubled and unstable environment, this additional 
foreign involvement is unlikely to instill progress in the 
region as commercial interests vie with national politics 
leveraging pre-existing animosities to gain influence.  
With the obscene amount of foreign aid available 
either through the US or China, Pakistan is likely to 
escalate their use of force in the region to pacify the 
Baloch, thus enabling and even encouraging this power 
struggle to occur.  With the War on Terrorism likely 
winding down in neighboring Afghanistan in 2011 as 
President Obama prepares to unveil his plan for troop 
withdrawals along with deteriorating relations with the 
United States, Pakistan can anticipate a decrease in U.S. 
foreign aid.  In order to maintain their position in the 
region, Pakistan must replace and augment their current 
treasury lest the balance of power gap between them and 
India widen dramatically further.   
Added to this, as India increases its pressures in 
what could be construed as a surrounding tactic with the 
Chabahar Port project and associated road network to 
Afghanistan, Pakistan is on the brink of being completely 
marginalized in the region.  At this point, the continuing 
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nuclear standoff between Pakistan and India takes on 
renewed interest.  Although the likelihood of India 
invading Pakistan and jeopardizing their own growth is 
minimal, the perception and policies of Pakistan are 
unknown in this future environment.   
It is similarly unlikely that Pakistan will meet the 
demands of the Baloch and their calls for any level of 
autonomy.  The Pakistani government and the Baloch need to 
reach consensus soon as they both stand to lose in their 
current tactics.  A stronger Iran and an Afghanistan allied 
with India will squeeze Pakistan and further exacerbate 
their problems.  With both of these countries having 
sympathetic Baloch populations, they stand to gain access 
to the Pakistani Baloch region, chipping away at Pakistan’s 
tenuous hold.  Success in this arena will likely further 
empower the Pashtun, who also have a sizeable population in 
Afghanistan and have their own problems with the Pakistani 
government.  Although this seems to be an acceptable option 
for the Baloch, it is unlikely that their new benefactors 
will allow them any more autonomy that Pakistan does; in 
effect they will just trade masters.  Finally, reaching 
this new arrangement is likely to come at a high human 
cost.  So the question really is how much are the Baloch 
willing to lose for the chance at marginal (at best) gains?  
 77 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Ahmed, Akbar S. Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity and 
Leadership in South Asia. Karachi: Oxford University 
Press, 1986. 
 
Ahmed, Sarfaraz. “The Latest Hotspot: Gwadar.” The Daily 




Akbar, Malik Siraj. "Seminar discusses impact of conflict 
on Balochistan’s politics and economy." The Baloch 





Akhtar, Sajjad. "Balochistan versus Pakistan." Economic & 
Political Weekly, 2007: 1-10. 
 
alaiwah. Constitutional Distribution of Natural Gas and 




Ali, Aamjad Syed. Glimpses. Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992. 
 









Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. "Support Balochi Separatists." 







ANI. "'Undeniable' evidence regarding India's involvmenet 




Anis, Khurrum, and James Rupert. "Wen Visits Pakistan to 
Revive Road-Rail Network from China to Persian Gulf." 





Asian Development Bank. "Balochistan Road Development 





Bajoria, Jayshree. "Pakistan's Constitution." Council on 




Baloch, Dr. Wahid. "Baloch leader Seeks Support in USA." 




Baloch, Mir Ahmad. "Baloch History." Jimdo. 2010. 
http://shohaz.jimdo.com/baloch-history/. 
 
Baloch, Sarbaaz. "Rehman Malik rubs salt on Baloch wounds." 




Baloch, Zaffar. "Balochistan's Burden of Slavery." Baluch 









BBC News. "Pakistan militants killed 2,500 in 2010, report 
says." BBC News - South Asia. April 14, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13085776. 
 
Berlin, Donald L. India-Iran Relations: A Deepening 
Entente. Special Assessment, Honolulu, HI: Asia-
Pacific Center for Security Studies, Oct 2004. 
 




Blank, Stephen. "China's recent energy gains in Central 
Asia: What do they portend?" Central Asia-Caucasus 
Analyst, October 31, 2007: 1-3. 
 
Blood, Peter. Pakistan: A Country Study. GPO for the 
Library of Congress, Washington: Library of Congress, 
1994. 
 
Brooks, Stephen G. Producing Security: Multinational 
Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus 
of Conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005. 
 
Bugti, Dera. "Asia: The tribes arise; Balochistan." The 




Call, Charles T., and Gigja Sorensen. U.N. Peace Operations 
and State Building: A Case Study of Haiti. Case Study, 
New York City: Center on International Cooperation, 
2009. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency. "South Asia:: Pakistan." The 




Cohen, Ariel. "U.S. Interests and Central Asia Energy 





Cohen, Ariel, Lisa Curtis, and Owen Graham. "The Proposed 
Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline: An Unacceptable Risk 






Cox, Mike, and Richard Alm. The Fruits of Free Trade. 
Annual Report, Dallas: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 
2002. 
 
Crisis Balochistan. "Dr. Nazar: A Man's Struggle For His 




Daily Balochistan Express. "Railroad system will be ready 
in three years time, says Governor." Gwadar News. 
February 17, 2004. 
http://www.gwadarnews.com/newsdetail.asp?newsID=48. 
 
Dames, Mansel Longworth. The Baloch Race: A Historical and 
Ethnological Sketch. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 
1904. 
 
Dasthi, Dr. Nasir. "A Brief History of Balochistan." Baloch 
Homeland. June 15, 2009. 
http://www.balochhomeland.com/homeland-article2.htm. 
 
Dawn. "Baloch rebels claim kidnap of UN refugee official." 
The Dawn. February 7, 2009. 
http://archives.dawn.com/archives/126906. 
 




Escobar, Pepe. "Balochistan is the Ultimate Prize." Asia 
Times. May 9, 2009. 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KE09Df03.html. 
 
Fazl-e-Haider, Syed. "Balochistan: Challenges and 
Opportunties." Experts Meeting on Afghanistan and 
Regional Stabilisation. Rome: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2009. 1-17. 
 81 





Grare, Frédéric. Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch 
Nationalism. South Asia Project, Washington D.C.: 
Carnegie Endownment for International Peace, 2006. 
 
Grau, Lester W. "Hydrocarbons and a New Strategic Region: 





Haider, Ziad. "Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar 
Port." Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 
2005: 95-103. 
 
Haq, Ameerah. "Timor-Leste: top UN envoy highlights 
progress toward stability and security." UN News 




Harrison, Selig S. In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch 
Nationalism and Soviet Temptations. New York: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1981. 
 
Harrison, Selig S. "Nightmare in Baluchistan." Foreign 
Policy, 1978: 136-160. 
 
Hasanabadi, Hafeez. "The interests of Russia and America in 
Balochistan, Crucial time for Baloch leadership to 




Hassan, Lt. Col. Zaheerul. "Trilateral Talks & U.S. 








———. "U.S. Motives behind Balochistan Movement." Asian 




Himadree. "Victim of Sui rape case still waits for 




IMF Staff. "Globalization: Threat of Opportunity?" 





Imtiaz, Saba. "MPs told Russia, India and UAE involved in 




Innocent, Malou. "Explaining America and Pakistan’s 
Troubling Mutual Dependence (and Hostility)." The 





IntelliBriefs. "Extrajudicial killings in Balochistan: 
Baloch in US appeal to UN and world community." 




International Crisis Group. "Pakistan: The Worsening 
Conflict in Balochistan." International Crisis Group. 





Irregular Warfare Centre. "Unconventional Solutions for 





Kakatkar-Kulkarni, Manasi. "India's Baloch Dilemma." India: 




Kaplan, Robert D. “Center Stage for the Twenty-first 




———. Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American 
Power. New York City: Random House, 2010. 
 
Kemp, Geoffrey. The East Moves West: India, China and 
Asia's Growing Presence in the Middle East. Washington 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010. 
 
Khan, Dr. Raja Muhammad. "Nexus of Conspiracies in 




Khan, Shaheed Rafi. Regional Trade Integration and Conflict 
Resolution. New York City: Routledge, 2009. 
 
Ledgerwood, Judy L. "UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Lessons 




Looney, Robert E. "Pakistan's Progress Toward Economic 
Freedom." Contemporary South Asia, June 1, 1997: 79-
98. 
 
Looney, Robert E. "Problems in Using International Trade to 
Counter Terrorism: The Case of Pakistan." Journal of 
South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 2003: 1-10. 
 
Luft, Gal. "Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline: The Baloch 
Wildcard." Institute for the Analysis of Global 
Security. January 12, 2005. 
http://www.iags.org/n0115042.htm. 
 
MacGregor, Sir Charles Metcalfe. Wanderings in Balochistan. 
London: W. H. Allen and Co, 1882. 
 
 84 
Malik, Huma Aamir. "Balochistan Railway Track Blown Up 3rd 




Marri, Dr. Jumma Khan. "Baloch Nation in leadership 




Masson, Charles. Narratives of Various Journeys in 
Balochistan, Afghanistan and the Panjab. London: 
Richard Bentley, 1842. 
 
McMillan, Tricia. "What Canada can do to increase UN 




Melese, Francois. "The financial crisis: a similar effect 




Meyer-Resende, Michael, and Hannah Roberts. "Pakistan's 




Mushtaq, Muhammad, and Syed Khawaja Alqama. “Poverty 
Alleviation Through Power-Sharing in Pakistan.” 
European Journal of Social Sciences 8, no. 3 (2009): 
459-468. 
 
Mustikhan, Ahmar. "Pro-independence Baloch activists 
protest in Vancouver; Marri main leader." Baltimore 










———. "Sen. Mikulki exspresses concern over Balochistan 
human rights situation." Baltimore Foreign Policy 








Niazi, Tarique. "The Ongoing Baloch Insurgency in 
Pakistan." The Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism 




O’Connor, Patrick, and Danny Yadron. "Congress Questions 





O'Clery, Neave. "The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda: 




Ordons News Team. "Three more gas pipelines blown up in 




pakalert. Destabalizing Baluchistan, Fracturing Pakistan. 








Pike, John. Balochistan Insurgency - Fourth Conflict 1973 - 





———. Balochistan Insurgency - Second Conflict 1958 - 59. 




———. Balochistan Insurgency - Third Conflic 1963 - 69. 









———. "Bangladeshi War of Independence/Indo-Pakistani War of 




PREM Economic Policy Group and Development Economics Group. 
Globalization, Growth, and Poverty, Building an 
Inclusive World Economy. Briefing Paper, Oxford: World 
Bank and Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
PTI. "Iran erecting wall along the border with Pakistan." 
Outlook India.com. March 2, 2007. 
http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?455022. 
 





Quraishi, Ahmed. "Pakistani Kurdistan: Terrorists Preparing 
To Declare Independent Balochistan." International 
Analysts Network. August 5, 2009. http://www.analyst-
network.com/article.php?art_id=3080. 
 
Raman, B. "Baloch Freedom Fighters Attack Nuclear 





Rashid, Ahmed. "Renewed Strains Between Islamabad and 
Washington." BBC News South Asia. June 25, 2010. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10375056. 
 
Rashid, Malik. "Between US and Local Masters." Boloji. 
October 11, 2009. 
http://www.boloji.net/analysis2/0494.html. 
 
Ray, Aswini K. "From Autonomy to Self-Determination: The 
Politics of East Pakistan and Kashmir." Economic and 
Political Weekly, 2001: 38-43. 
 
Reuters. "India aiding Baluchistan rebels: Musharraf." 




Roy, Bhaskar. "China's String of Pearls." Twenty-22: India 




Rumi, Raza. "Pakistan: Separatism and its Discontents." 








Sarjou, Mehrab. "The demands for independent Baluchistan no 




Schaefer, Brett. "Time for a new United Nations 
Peacekeeping Organization." The Heritage Foundation. 








Shah, Marshuk Ali. "2nd Euro-Asian Road Transport 
Conference." International Road Transport Union. 




Shah, Mehtab Ali. The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic 
Impacts on Diplomacy 1971 - 1994. New York City: I. B. 
Taurus and Co. Ltd., 1997. 
 
Shahzad, Syed Saleem. "Tribals looking down a barrel in 
Balochistan." Asia Times Online. January 15, 2005. 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GA15Df07.html. 
 
Shashikumar, VK. "Indian built Zaranj-Delaram Highway under 




Shawcross, William. "Paving the Road to Hell: The Failure 





Siddiqi, Muhammad Ali, and Shamim-ur Rahman. "Baloch to go 
to any Lengths for Rights: Khan of Kalat." The Dawn. 
November 8, 2004. 
http://archives.dawn.com/2004/11/08/top2.htm. 
 
Siddiqi, Shahid R. "Why Insurgency in Balochistan Cannot 




Singh, T. Khurschev, and Alok Bansal. "Violence in 
Pakistan: Trend Analysis January 2009." Institute for 




Stanton, John. "Balochistan, Power Politics and the Battle 





Starr, S. Frederick. "A Partnership for Central Asia." 




Sud, Hari. "Pakistan as Network Headquarter for Natural Gas 





Swidler, Nina. "Kalat: The Political Economy of a Tribal 
Chiefdom." American Ethnologist, 1992: 553-570. 
 
Talpur, Mir Mohammad Ali. "Balochistan: Ground Zero." 




Tilly, Charles. Social Movements, 1768-2004. Boulder: 
Paradigm Publishers, 2004. 
 
Titus, Paul, and Nina Swidler. "Knights, Not Pawns: Ethno-
Nationallism and Regional Dynamics in Post-Colonial 
Balochistan." International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, 2000: 47-69. 
 
UNPO. "Balochistan: Its Importance For The Iran-Pakistan-
India Gas Pipeline." Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization. March 23, 2010. 
http://www.unpo.org/article/10894. 
 
———. "UNPO Covenant." Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization. October 28, 2006. 
http://www.unpo.org/section/2/1. 
 
———. "UNPO Membership." Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization. October 2006. 
http://www.unpo.org/section/2/3. 
 






Walsh, Declan. "Pakistan's Gas Fields Blaze as Rape Sparks 




Weaver, Mary Ann. Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and 
Afghanistan. New York City: Straus and Giroux, 2002. 
 
Weitz, Richard. "Averting a new great game in central 
Asia." The Washington Quarterly, 2006: 155-167. 
 
Wirsing, Robert G. Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics 
of Energy Resources: The Changing Context of 
Separatism in Pakistan. Security Studies Update, 
Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008. 
 
Wolpert, Stanley. A New History of India. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
 
Zambelis, Chris. "Insurrection in Iranian Balochistan ." 













Zulfiqar, Shazada. "We have launched a struggle for Baloch 
freedom from the yoke of Punjab's slavery." Baloch 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. Marine Corps Representative 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California  
 
4. Director, Training and Education 
MCCDC, Code C46 
 Quantico, Virginia 
  
5. Director, Marine Corps Research Center 
MCCDC, Code C40RC 
 Quantico, Virginia 
  
6. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity  
(Attn: Operations Officer) 
 Camp Pendleton, California 
